Did household consumption become more volatile? by Gorbachev, O.
  
 
 
 
Edinburgh Research Explorer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Did household consumption become more volatile?
Citation for published version:
Gorbachev, O 2011, 'Did household consumption become more volatile?' American Economic Review, vol
101, no. 5, pp. 2248-2270. DOI: 10.1257/aer.101.5.2248
Digital Object Identifier (DOI):
10.1257/aer.101.5.2248
Link:
Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer
Document Version:
Peer reviewed version
Published In:
American Economic Review
Publisher Rights Statement:
©Gorbachev, O. (2011). Did household consumption become more volatile?. American Economic Review,
101(5), 2248-2270. 10.1257/aer.101.5.2248
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s)
and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and
abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer
content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please
contact openaccess@ed.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and
investigate your claim.
Download date: 28. Apr. 2017
Did Household Consumption Become More Volatile?∗
[Accepted for publication by AER]
Olga Gorbachev†
May 26, 2010
Abstract
I show that after accounting for predictable variation arising from movements in
real interest rates, preferences and income shocks, liquidity constraints and measure-
ment errors, volatility of household consumption in the US increased by 23.5 percent
between 1970 and 2004. The increase was lower than that of volatility of family income.
However, nonwhite households and household with less than 13 years of education, for
whom there was no diﬀerential increase in income volatility, experienced signiﬁcantly
larger increase in volatility of household consumption. The eﬀect of race and education
remained signiﬁcant even after income, working history, marital status, family size and
composition were controlled for. Substantial diﬀerences in wealth and access to credit
markets point to the main reason for this divide.
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1 Introduction
By now it is well documented that volatility of male earnings increased substantially from
the 1970s to early 1980s, was stable in the 1980s to early 1990s, and began to increase
again since the mid 1990s.1 Volatility of family income, both its permanent and transitory
components, also increased since the 1970s.2
Greater income uncertainty, however, may not necessarily translate into welfare losses if
people can ﬁnd ways to smooth consumption. Having a good measure of the volatility of
household consumption is thus fundamental to assessing whether, and to what extent, wel-
fare was aﬀected by increased income shocks. In this paper, I provide a novel way to compute
household level volatility of consumption. I use an incomplete markets consumption model3
with nonseparable preferences for food and other nondurable goods, controlling for measure-
ment error in consumption and liquidity constraints. I estimate volatility of consumption
using Panel Studies of Income Dynamics (PSID) data.4 I ﬁnd that after accounting for pre-
dictable variations in consumption due to changes in family composition and structure, real
interest rates, income uncertainty and cash on hand (as a proxy for precautionary savings),
and after controlling for measurement error in consumption, nonseparability of preferences,
and liquidity constraints, mean volatility of household food consumption increased by 43
percent between 1970 and 2004. This is a conservative estimate since food consumption is
1See for example, Moﬃtt and Gottschalk [1994, 1998, 2002], Dynarski and Gruber [1997], Haider [2001],
Hacker [2006], Dynan et al. [2007], Keys [2008], Shin and Solon [2008], Jensen and Shore [2008].
2See for example Dynan et al. [2007], Keys [2008], Shin and Solon [2008], and Jensen and Shore [2008].
3There are many studies documenting that ﬁnancial markets are incomplete. For example, a recent paper
by Blundell et al. [2008] ﬁnds some partial insurance of permanent shocks, especially for the college educated
and those near retirement, and full insurance of transitory shocks except among poor households. Other
examples include: Cochrane [1991], Attanasio and Davis [1996], Krueger and Perri [2006], and many others.
4Another frequently used source of consumption data on household level, Consumer Expenditure Survey,
is unsuitable for this study as it has a very short time dimension of only four quarters. I don’t use CES data
directly to compute my measures of consumption volatility. Instead I use CES data to estimate elasticity
of food with respect to nondurables for all available years of data, allowing elasticities to change over time,
and then compute the evolution of nondurable consumption based on these estimates.
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well known to have low income elasticity.5 In fact, using estimates of elasticity of food with
respect to other nondurables, I ﬁnd that volatility of nondurable consumption went up by
51 percent. If, in addition, measurement error fell over this period, the increase in volatility
might still be an underestimate.6
For households headed by nonwhite and poorly educated individuals, the rise in volatility
was signiﬁcantly larger than for the average household. Race did not play a signiﬁcant role
in the way income volatility increased over the period. On the other hand, households whose
head was nonwhite experienced a signiﬁcantly larger increase in volatility of consumption
than that endured by white households, a rise of 53 percent vs. that of 25 percent, re-
spectively. Education also played an important role. Households with lower education had a
smaller increase in volatility of income than households with more than 12 years of education,
on the other hand, volatility of consumption for these households increased by much more,
by 47 vs. 17 percent, respectively. Even though the increase in consumption volatility was
signiﬁcantly smaller than that of family income uncertainty over the same period, household
volatility of income doubled, the cost to society from this rise was signiﬁcant. Using the
simplest back of the envelope calculation, I ﬁnd that an average household would be willing
to sacriﬁce 4.15 percent of their annual nondurable consumption to reduce consumption risk
back to where it was in 1971.7
The most relevant to this paper strand of literature estimates the response of consumption
to income shocks. Jappelli and Pistaferri [2010] provide a comprehensive review on the
state of this research. They document that there is considerable evidence that consumption
5See for example, Bunkers and Cochrane [1957].
6It is reasonable to believe that the measurement error fell in the sample due to increased household’s
duration in the survey, reduction in recall period from 1 year to 1 week, technological innovation in the
survey collection.
7I use a simple formula derived from Lucas [1987], where the cost of business cycle can be approximated
by 휇 = 12훾휎
2
푐 . Volatility of household food consumption was 0.087 in 1971 and went up to 0.147 by 2004.
My estimate of relative risk aversion 훾 = 1. Thus, the cost is 3 percent of household food consumption per
year. Since, the elasticity of food expenditure with respect to expenditure on nondurables is 0.85, consumers
would be willing to sacriﬁce 4.15 percent of annual nondurable consumption to lower risk to its 1971 level.
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appears to respond to anticipated income increases, over and above by what is implied
by standard models of consumption smoothing, and that at least to some extent, liquidity
constraints are an important culprit for this failure. A second ﬁnding that emerges from
the literature is that consumption reaction to permanent shocks is much higher than that to
transitory shocks. There is also evidence, at least in the US, that consumers do not revise
their consumption fully in response to permanent shocks. In fact, Carroll [2009], shows that
if consumers are impatient and are subject to transitory as well as permanent shocks, the
optimal marginal propensity to consume out of permanent shocks is strictly less than one,
because buﬀer-stock savers have a target wealth-to-permanent-income ratio; a positive shock
to permanent income moves the ratio below its target, temporarily boosting saving. Taken
together, these ﬁnding are consistent with the hypothesis that precautionary savings and
even perhaps insurance over and above self-insurance (achieved through government welfare
programs, family labor supply, or family networks) play an important role in consumption.
From Jappelli and Pistaferri [2010] survey, it is clear that a lot of thought and eﬀort has
gone into understanding how consumption responds to income shocks. But, there are few
studies that analyze the change in the ability of households to respond to income shocks.
Recent work by Blundell et al. [2008] studies changes in the joint distribution of income
and consumption between 1980 and 1993. By studying the link between consumption and
income inequality, the authors ﬁnd that household’s ability to insure against income shocks
has remained unchanged.
To my knowledge, the only other paper that examines changes in volatility of household
consumption is by Davis and Kahn [2008]. Using data from Consumer Expenditure Survey
for 1980-2004, which has a short panel dimension - 4 quarters of data over one year, the
authors compute volatility of consumption as absolute value of log change in nondurable
consumption expenditures for each household, as a diﬀerence between 1st and 4th quarter
consumption, and then average over households for each year of data. They also ﬁnd that
volatility of total nondurable consumption increased between 1980 and 2004. However, their
measure of volatility based on raw consumption data is purely descriptive and might suﬀer
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from measurement error, it might be incorrectly attributing an increase in their measure
to volatility, when indeed the increase is due to increased skill premium or simply life-cycle
considerations, preference shocks, or diﬀerences in discount factors across individual house-
holds. Changes in theses predictable components will have diﬀerent welfare implications from
changes in consumption due to household’s inability to smooth shocks due to uncertainty of
any kind.8 Another consideration that should be taken into account when using CES data
is that the survey has become much less reliable over the years as it highly underestimates
nondurable consumption.9 There are no such claims regarding PSID’s admittedly scarce
consumption data. In addition to these considerations, the study presented here provides
detailed decomposition results by race, education, income and marital status absent in the
Davis and Kahn [2008] paper. There are signiﬁcant diﬀerences observed between races and
educational groups that should not be overlooked when designing policy prescriptions.
The aim of this paper is to understand the link between income and consumption volatil-
ity. There is already a very large literature that tries to understand the link between income
and consumption inequality.10 It is important to mention that the two concepts, even though
related, are not the same.11 The main diﬀerence between the two is that one deals with re-
8For example, changes in consumption due to preference shocks, such as for example in expectation of
kids living/arriving home will appear as increase in volatility according to Davis and Kahn [2008] measure.
Clearly, these types of changes are not due to uncertainty and should not have the same welfare implications
as changes in consumption due to unexpected loss of a job or an unexpectedly high health care bill.
9Battistin [2004], Attanasio et al. [2004], and Battistin and Padula [2009] have documented that the gap
between the Personal Consumption Expenditure and CES nondurable consumption data has been growing
since 1990.
10See for example, Baker [1997], Gottschalk [1997] Moﬃtt and Gottschalk [1994, 2002], Katz and Autor
[1999], Blundell and Pistaferri [2003], Gyourko and Tracy [2003], Storesletten et al. [2004], Attanasio et al.
[2004], Krueger and Perri [2006], Blundell et al. [2008], Davis and Kahn [2008], Gordon and Dew-Becker
[2008], Keys [2008], Primiceri and vanRens [2009], Heathcote [2009].
11It is possible to come up with examples where inequality is rising in the society, but volatility is zero
or unchanged, and vice versa. Take an economy with 2 types: one who starts out poor and whose income
grows at 1 percent per year, and another, who starts out rich and whose income grows at 2 percent per year.
Inequality in this economy will be growing over time, but volatility will be zero and unchanging. Introducing
aggregate and/or idiosyncratic shocks (idiosyncratic shocks that come from the same distribution), indepen-
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source allocations and/or inequity and the other with individual intertemporal decisions.
Thus the two concepts are typically addressed using diﬀerent analytical frameworks. More
importantly, evolution of inequality and volatility may have diﬀerent welfare implications.
Addressing welfare implications from increased inequality is complex because of social pref-
erences or interpersonal competition.12 On the other hand, since the aim of households is
to minimize variability of consumption, reduction in volatility would be highly beneﬁcial.
Therefore, a study of intertemporal properties of household consumption and income will
add to our understanding of the changes aﬀecting households and their ability to cope with
these changes now versus 30 years ago.
2 Volatility of Household Income
As the ﬁrst step towards understanding changes in household welfare, I look at the evolution
of income volatility over the 1970-2004 period. As in Blundell et al. [2008], I assume that
the income process for each household ℎ is given by:
푙푛(푌ℎ,푎,푡) = 푍
′
ℎ,푎,푡휗푡 + 푃ℎ,푎,푡 + 휈ℎ,푎,푡 (1)
where 푎 and 푡 index age and time respectively, 푌 is real income, and 푍 is a set of income
characteristics observable and anticipated by consumers, that is allowed to change over time.
In individual labor income models, these regressors are usually proxied by age, age squared,
dummy variables for education, occupation and industry categories, and interactions between
age, age squared and education, sex and race indicators, cohort dummies, time dummies
(to control for aggregate shocks), and interaction terms. Since in the present case we are
interested in the family income process, I redeﬁne these parameters as those pertaining to
the head of household, and include additional parameters, such as head’s marital status,
dent of correlation of these shocks, will not change this result. Getting rid of heterogeneity will mean the
end to inequality. But even with increasing inequality, volatility might not change or even fall, as evolution
of volatility depends on the change in the size and correlation of the shocks aﬀecting households.
12See for example work by Sen [1980].
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number of hours worked by head and his partner, and the number of children and adults in
the household. I also control for cohort eﬀects.13 Equation (1) decomposes the remainder of
income into a permanent component 푃ℎ,푎,푡, which follows a martingale process of the form:
푃ℎ,푎,푡 = 푃ℎ,푎,푡−1+휍ℎ,푎,푡, where 휍ℎ,푎,푡 is serially uncorrelated; and the transitory mean-reverting
component, 휈ℎ,푎,푡.
14
The volatility of income, 휎2ℎ,푎,푡 is then measured as a square of the unexplained income
growth component, which is composed of household speciﬁc time varying shocks to perma-
nent and transitory income.
휎2ℎ,푎,푡 =
(
휍ℎ,푎,푡 +Δ휈ℎ,푎,푡
)2
=
(
Δ푙푛(푌ℎ,푎,푡)− ˆΔ푙푛(푌ℎ,푎,푡)
)2
(2)
I assume that households are unable to distinguish between these shocks, or that when a
household observes a shock to income, he is unable to distinguish between the two diﬀerent
shocks, or to disentangle the size of each shock.
Before looking at the actual volatility of income, it is useful to quickly describe the
data. I use Panel Study of Income Dynamics data for 1968-2004 period. I keep households
whose head was between the age of 25 and 65, was not retired, was not a student, was not
from Immigrant or Survey of Economic Opportunity sample, and who had positive food
consumption expenditure.15 For the reasons that will become apparent in the next section,
I keep only households who I classify as liquidity unconstrained, based on their level of non-
housing wealth. In 2004, average household was 43 years old, had 1 child, was 17 percent
likely headed by a female, was 10 percent likely to be nonwhite, 72 percent likely to be
married and 6 percent likely to be a single parent. Average family income in 2004 was
$50,183 and average non-housing net wealth was $136,203; with 76 percent of households
owning a home, average home value was $195,349. On average, households spent 8 percent
of their income on food expenditures.
13The importance of including cohort eﬀects is highlighted, in for example Blundell et al. [2008].
14This is a standard model of the income process, see for example MaCurdy [1982], Hall and Mishkin [1982],
Abowd and Card [1986], Moﬃtt and Gottschalk [1994]; or Banks et al. [2001] and Meghir and Pistaferri
[2004] for more recent studies.
15Appendix provides detailed explanation on how the data sample was created.
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These averages mask dramatic diﬀerences within income distribution even for liquidity
unconstrained households. Households whose real family income in 2004 was less than or
equal to $11,504 (or $9,140 per eﬀective person, p.e.p.16) were in the bottom 20 percent of
the income distribution.17 These households spent about 27 percent of their income to cover
food consumption; and had on average $28,492 in non housing net wealth. The median of
the income distribution was at $35,408 ($22,420 p.e.p.). A median household spent about 11
percent of their income on food in 2004, though this ratio was much higher at 17 percent in
1970. Non housing wealth for the median household was at $81,760. Households whose real
incomes were at or above $111,973 ($63,274 p.e.p.) were the richest 20 percent. They spent
only 6 percent of their income on food consumption, and had $345,840 in non housing wealth.
These statistics illustrate acute diﬀerences observed in our sample, and these diﬀerences will
play an important role on how income volatility aﬀected household welfare.
Figure 1 illustrates evolution of the mean of 휎2ℎ,푎,푡 and its 90/10 percentile ratio for annual
and biennial samples.18 It is clear that volatility of family income increased substantially
since the beginning of the period. Computed on annual data, which is available from 1968
to 1996, volatility rose steadily between 1970 and 1986, increasing by 65 percent; it dipped
between 1986 and 1991, falling by 15 percent; and then began rising again. The 90th
percentile of volatility series almost doubled between 1970 and 1996, rising gradually between
1970 and 1991, by 15 percent; and then shooting up from 0.30 to 0.54 by 1996. The 10th
percentile, on the other hand, was ﬂat over the entire period, contributing to the diﬀerential
trends between the mean and the 90/10 percentile ratio.
Family income volatility in the biennial sample also increased over the period. Figure 1
clearly shows that this increase continued until 2004. A comparison of biennial and annual
data series illustrates that there were no diﬀerences in patterns between the mean volatility
16To convert family income into eﬀective units, I divide family income by the square root of the size of
the household.
17Since family income is a sum of labor, rental, business and asset income, it can be zero or even negative.
18Biennial volatility is computed as: 휎2ℎ,푎,푡 =
(
푙푛(푌ℎ,푎,푡) − 푙푛(푌ℎ,푎,푡−2) − ˆ푙푛(푌ℎ,푎,푡) − ˆ푙푛(푌ℎ,푎,푡−2)
)2
=(
휍ℎ,푎,푡 + 휍ℎ,푎,푡−1 + 휈ℎ,푎,푡 − 휈ℎ,푎,푡−2
)2
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Figure 1: Volatility of Family Income
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Legend Key: Long-dash is for 90/10 percentile ratio, and solid is the mean of volatility of family income,
휎2ℎ,푎,푡, based on equation (2).
Note: Annual graph is based on annual growth rates data sample, and biennial graph on the biennial
growth rates, such as
휎2ℎ,푎,푡 =
(
푙푛(푌ℎ,푎,푡)− 푙푛(푌ℎ,푎,푡−2)− ˆ푙푛(푌ℎ,푎,푡)− ˆ푙푛(푌ℎ,푎,푡−2)
)2
=
(
휍ℎ,푎,푡 + 휍ℎ,푎,푡−1 + 휈ℎ,푎,푡 − 휈ℎ,푎,푡−2
)2
and that of 90/10 percentile ratio between 1970 and 1996. After 1996, the 90/10 ratio fell
signiﬁcantly whereas the mean continued to rise. These diﬀerences come from the fact that
the 10th percentile rose dramatically over 1996-2004 period, climbing from 0.0007 in 1996
to 0.0011 by 2004.
These ﬁndings are very close to those obtained by Dynan et al. [2007], who document
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that family income volatility increased since the 1970s, and in particular since the 1990s.
They show that the probability of large increases in income (larger than 25%) increased from
on average 9% between 1970 and 1990, to 15% by 2002; though this probability fell back to
9% by 2004. At the same time, probability of getting a large negative shock (larger than
25%) was stable around 9% until late 1990s, it increased substantially to almost 14% by
2004.
Increase in income volatility does not necessarily translate into higher welfare costs as
members of household can smooth consumption by adjusting their working hours, borrowing
or utilizing their savings. Thus, to analyze whether household’s welfare was aﬀected by in-
creased income uncertainty, I examine the evolution of variability of household consumption.
3 A Consumption Model
In order to construct a measure of volatility of consumption, I ﬁrst take out predictable
variations in consumption, by using a permanent-income hypothesis model under imperfect
ﬁnancial markets, and then construct volatility as a square of the unpredictable component.
Computing volatility of consumption on raw data is unsuitable when one is concerned with
welfare calculations. Changes in consumption growth due to predictable components, such as
for example due to changes in preferences or precautionary savings, will have diﬀerent welfare
implications from changes in consumption due to household’s inability to smooth shocks due
to uncertainty of any kind. In the absence of perfect insurance, households are unable to
insure against income shocks, with the consequence that an increase in unanticipated risk
would directly increase volatility of consumption especially if households have limited ability
to smooth out these shocks. Since families desire to smooth consumption, such an increase
in volatility would have a negative impact on welfare, other things being equal.
Consumption growth varies with preferences or demographics, the risk free interest rate,
anticipated income shocks, cash-on-hand relative to future wealth, and idiosyncratic risk.
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To see this, consider a typical Euler equation.
퐸푡
[
푈 ′(퐶ℎ,푡+1; 휃ℎ,푡+1)(1 + 푟ℎ,푡+1)(1 + 휆ℎ,푡+1)
푈 ′(퐶ℎ,푡; 휃ℎ,푡)(1 + 훿ℎ)
]
= 1 (3)
where ℎ stands for household and 푡 for time; 퐶ℎ,푡 is real consumption of family ℎ in period
푡; 휃ℎ,푡 are family ℎ
′푠 tastes; 훿ℎ is its rate of time preference and is assumed to be household
speciﬁc but time invariant; 퐸푡 is the expectation operator, conditional on information avail-
able at time 푡; 푟ℎ,푡+1 is the ex post real return on risk free asset held by family ℎ between
periods 푡 and 푡 + 1; 휆ℎ,푡+1 is the extra utility that would result from borrowing an extra
dollar, consuming it, and reducing consumption the next period accordingly to repay the
debt. If 휆ℎ,푡+1 > 0, the liquidity constraint is binding and the family cannot borrow as much
as it wants, and thus will have to consume out of current assets.
In order to allow for precautionary savings and nonseparability of preferences between
consumption of food and other nondurables,19 and to be able to take the model to the data,
I assume that the utility function takes the constant relative risk aversion form, such that
푈(푂ℎ,푡, 퐹ℎ,푡; 휃ℎ,푡) = 푒
휃ℎ,푡
[푂훼ℎ,푡퐹 훽ℎ,푡
1− 훾
]1−훾
(4)
where 퐹ℎ,푡 is food consumption and 푂ℎ,푡 is consumption of other nondurable goods, such
that 푝퐹푡 퐹ℎ,푡 + 푝
푂
푡 푂ℎ,푡 = 퐶ℎ,푡; 훼 and 훽 are share parameters measuring the importance of
consumption of other nondurable goods relative to food and visa versa; and 훾 controls the
degree of relative risk aversion.20
Using the above functional form for the utility function, rational expectations, and taking
2nd order Taylor approximation of the above Euler equation,21 the growth rate of household
19As pointed out by example Attanasio and Weber [1995], Meghir and Weber [1996], Banks et al. [1997]
it is important to control for nonseparability of food consumption relative to consumption of other goods.
20The coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion with this utility speciﬁcation is given by −퐹푈퐹퐹
푈퐹
= 1− 훽(1− 훾).
Intertemporal elasticity of substitution for food consumption is pinned down by 1
훽(1−훾)−1 .
21Attanasio and Low [2004] show that a log-linearized Euler equation for consumption yields consistent
estimates of the preference parameters when utility is isoelastic and a sample covers a long time period. The
requirement on the length of the panel is imposed in order to tackle estimation problems that arise due to
the presence of liquidity constraints.
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food consumption, Δ푙푛(퐹ℎ,푡+1), is a function of anticipated changes in demographics or
preferences Δ휃ℎ,푡+1, risk free interest rate 푙푛(1 + 푟ℎ,푡+1), the shadow price of borrowing an
extra dollar 푙푛(1+휆ℎ,푡+1), personal discount rate 푙푛(1+훿ℎ), inﬂation in food prices, Δ푙푛푝
퐹
푡+1,
inﬂation diﬀerential between food and other nondurables, Δ푙푛푝푂푡+1−Δ푙푛푝
퐹
푡+1, precautionary
saving motive, 푉푡휖ℎ,푡+1, and idiosyncratic shocks to consumption growth, 휍ℎ,푡+1.
Δ푙푛퐹ℎ,푡+1 =
1
1− (1− 훾)(훼 + 훽)
[
Δ휃ℎ,푡+1 + 푙푛(1 + 푟ℎ,푡+1) + 푙푛(1 + 휆ℎ,푡+1) + 푙푛(1 + 훿ℎ)
]
−
1
1− (1− 훾)(훼 + 훽)
[
Δ푙푛푝퐹푡+1 + 훼(1− 훾)(Δ푙푛푝
푂
푡+1 −Δ푙푛푝
퐹
푡+1)
]
+ 푧ℎ,푡+1 (5)
where
푧ℎ,푡+1 =
훼(1− 훾)− 1
(1− 훽(1− 훾))(1− (1− 훾)(훼 + 훽))
[
휍퐹ℎ,푡+1 −
푉푡휖
퐹
ℎ,푡+1
2
]
−
훽훼(1− 훾)2
(1− 훽(1− 훾))(1− (1− 훾)(훼 + 훽))
[
휍푂ℎ,푡+1 +
푉푡휖
푂
ℎ,푡+1
2
]
= 휍ℎ,푡+1 −
푉푡휖ℎ,푡+1
2
It is well known that consumption is measured with error. To control for this error, I
follow Alan et al. [2005] in assuming that measurement error is stationary and independent
of all the regressors, including lagged values of the measurement error and expectations error,
consumption levels and interest rates.22 The error term, 푧ℎ,푡+1 contains
When liquidity constraints are not binding, 휆ℎ,푡+1 = 0, and equations (5) is simpliﬁed.
If liquidity constraints are ignored, then their presence will show up in the error term.23
Since PSID does not proved direct measures of liquidity constraints, I classify households
22These assumptions mean that the expected growth rate of the measurement error is zero, and its variance
is a constant, which could be households or group speciﬁc.
23It is important to control for liquidity constraints as otherwise coeﬃcient estimates will be biased. In
addition, if liquidity constraints are changing over time, estimates of consumption volatility might pick up
those changes rather than actual estimates of consumption uncertainty. The risk of this is small, since
recent work by Dogra [2009], who used data from Survey of Consumer Finances, shows that, on average,
the probability of being denied credit did not change over the 1980-2007 period, despite the extraordinary
increase in US household debt.
12
as unconstrained if they hold positive amounts of net non-housing wealth.24 Information
on wealth holdings is available for 1984, 1989, 1994, 1999, and biennially thereafter, thus I
estimate the probability of household having positive net non-housing wealth for the missing
years.25 Once households are classiﬁed into constrained and unconstrained, based on the
actual and estimated probability of having positive non-housing net wealth,26 I split the
sample and estimate equation (5) on the sample of unconstrained households.27
This split might be too restrictive as I might be counting as constrained those households
that were actually unconstrained, since households with zero net worth might still be able
to borrow. Since information on availability of credit and ability of households to receive a
loan of desirable size is unavailable in PSID, it is diﬃcult to know how many households I
am under/over classifying. Combining Survey of Consumer Finances, which provides such
information but is not a panel and does not have information on consumption, and PSID
data, Jappelli et al. [1998] ﬁnd that only 12 percent of households classiﬁed as liquidity
constrained based on having positive assets (not positive net wealth) are actually uncon-
strained, whereas 5 percent of households that are classiﬁed as unconstrained are actually
liquidity constrained.28 Even though Jappelli et al. [1998] results do not fully eliminate the
24Net worth was calculated as the sum of the net values of the following assets owned by the households:
real estate other than main home, vehicles, farms or businesses, private annuities, IRAs, money in checking
or savings accounts, money market funds, certiﬁcates of deposit, government saving bonds, Treasury bills,
and any other savings or assets; minus any other debts held by a household.
25For each year wealth data is available, I estimate probability of having positive net non-housing wealth,
as a function of observable characteristics such as age, age squared, cohort, race, gender, education, real
house value, real rental and mortgage cost, dummy for whether renter or owner, marital status, number
of kids, number of adults, real family income, real asset income, information on welfare, unemployment or
other public transfers receipts, and state of residence. I estimate these probit regressions for available year
of data, and predict the expected probability of having positive non-housing net wealth for previous 5 years.
26Household is classiﬁed as unconstrained if it has positive non-housing wealth for the years wealth data
is available, or if the data is not available, based on the estimated probability of having positive non-housing
net wealth being greater than 0.5.
27This strategy is very similar to the one employed by Zeldes [1989] or more recently by Parker and Preston
[2005].
28Jappelli et al. [1998] ﬁnd that households with less than college education, unemployed, or younger than
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danger of misclassiﬁcation, it seems that losing unconstrained households, and misclassifying
constrained households, should lower the power of estimated coeﬃcients, but it should not
bias the results. In one of the model speciﬁcations I will control for this misclassiﬁcation by
including the estimated probability of having positive non-housing net wealth as one of the
regressors.
The precautionary saving motive depends on the household’s expectations about the
uncertainty associated with future exogenous variables, such as for example, uncertainty
about income and/or health. Families with higher uncertainty of future family income will
have higher savings and therefore lower consumption today. Some families might have higher
uncertainty of medical expenses and thus lower consumption. As pointed out by Browning
and Lusardi [1996], precautionary savings also depend on the current level of cash-on-hand
relative to expected future income. Families with identical income volatilities but lower
current wealth will have higher precautionary savings. I proxy precautionary savings using
the estimated volatility of family income, 휎2ℎ,푎,푡, computed according to equation (2). To
control for cash-on-hand, I include as regressors information on the change in the value of
real rental payments and real mortgage payments, the change in whether household owns or
rents, and the change in the value of their house.
Food consumption is measured as a sum of food at home plus food away from home
plus food stamps. As households grow richer, they substitute basic food items for those of
higher quality (and thus more expensive goods) or into food away from home. Before the
1970s, food away from home constituted a very small proportion of annual food expense.
But, since then, while food prices fell dramatically,29 the number of fast food restaurants
per capita doubled and the number of full-service restaurants per capita increased by 35%,30
and food away from home took a larger proportion of household’s expenditure. In addition,
38 are more likely to be turned down for a loan. Lyons [2003] ﬁnds that borrowing gap has narrowed since
1983 and most dramatically between 1992 and 1998. But that individuals younger than 35, who are black,
or poorly educated continued to be constrained, though the constraints have loosened for them as well.
29See Figure A1 in the Appendix.
30See for example Cutler et al. [2003], or Chou et al. [2004] for detailed review of food prices and evolution
of restaurants.
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due to rising working hours and female labor force participation, preparation cost for food
at home increased. Thus, I ﬁnd it more appropriate to use the total food bill as a measure
of household consumption.
3.1 Estimation Strategy
The estimation strategy allows for household ﬁxed eﬀects to account for household speciﬁc
discount factors. I also control for the possibility that labor decisions are not separable from
the marginal utility of consumption by including the change in the total number of hours
worked by the head of the household and by their partner.31
To address endogeneity that arises due to presence of second and higher-order terms in
the residual, it is typical to estimate the model using as instruments information known at
time 푡.32 Since the instrument set includes lagged terms of all the parameters in the Euler
equation, it violates strict exogeneity assumptions required by the IV estimator. Addition-
ally, as pointed out by Nickell [1981] estimated coeﬃcients under within estimator together
with predetermined regressors will give biased and inconsistent results.33 One more issue to
keep in mind is the limited temporal size of this highly unbalanced sample.
To get consistent estimates, I use forward orthogonal deviations transform in order to
purge the data from ﬁxed eﬀects proposed by Arellano and Bover [1995]. I use orthogonal
transformation instead of ﬁrst diﬀerences, as forward transform reduces the loss of observa-
tions when the data is highly unbalanced. Instead of subtracting the previous observation
from the contemporaneous one, forward transform subtracts the average of all future avail-
able observations of a variable. Thus it minimizes data loss, and since lagged observations
don’t enter the formula, they become valid instruments. I perform a two-step Arellano-Bond
(AB) GMM estimation that allows for heteroscedasticity and intragroup correlation. I also
make the Windmeijer ﬁnite-sample correction to the reported standard errors in two-step
31The inclusion of the information on the labor supply decision is important for the identiﬁcation purposes,
see Attanasio [1999].
32See Attanasio and Low [2004] for a detailed discussion of issues involved in estimating Euler equations.
33I thank the anonymous referee for this comment.
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estimation, without which those standard errors tend to be severely downward biased. I
limit the number of instruments to one lag, and use second lag of the explanatory variables
plus marginal tax rate as instruments, in order to reduce the potential eﬃciency loss this
type of GMM estimators could suﬀer. Too many instruments will not compromise the coef-
ﬁcient estimates but will weaken the Sargan/Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions. In
addition, too many instruments can over-ﬁt endogenous variables.34
In my preferred estimation, I control for both nonseparabilities of preferences, liquidity
constraints, and the estimated probability of having positive net-wealth. By including the
estimated probability of having positive wealth, I control for the possibility of misclassiﬁ-
cation of households into liquidity constrained and unconstrained. All the necessary tests
for the consistency of estimation are passed. Speciﬁcally, I fail to reject the null for both
the Sargan test (p-value=0.693) and the Hansen test (p-value=0.266) of overidentiﬁcation
restrictions.35 My estimate of intertemporal elasticity of substitution (IES) is consistent with
other studies and is estimated at 1.32 with robust standard error of 0.78.36
3.2 Evolution of Consumption Risk
To compute volatility of household consumption, I ﬁrst predict residuals, 푧ˆℎ,푡+1, from the
Euler equation (5). I then subtract out household ﬁxed eﬀects 휅ℎ, thus subtracting out
household speciﬁc discount factors that are not directly computed by AB-GMM estimator,
and time ﬁxed eﬀects 휏푡, to center the residuals. I then construct consumption volatility
parameter as the square of the residual 휍ˆ2ℎ,푡+1 =
(
푧ˆℎ,푡+1 − 휅ℎ − 휏푡
)2
.
To summarize the evolution of volatility of household consumption, I postulate that it is
a function of a linear time trend and other explanatory variables, 푋ℎ,푡:
휍ˆ2ℎ,푡+1 = 훽0,푔 + 훽1,푔푡 +푋
′
ℎ,푡훾푔 + 휔ℎ,푡+1 (6)
34See for example Roodman [2009] on the problems too many instruments could cause this type of GMM
estimator.
35In Tables 3 and 4 in the Appendix provide detailed estimates of the Euler equation using simple OLS,
LSDV and GMM estimation strategies.
36See for example Attanasio and Weber [1995], Attanasio [1999], and Attanasio and Low [2004].
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Figure 2: Volatility of Food Consumption
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Legend Key: Long-dash is for 90/10 percentile ratio, and solid is for the average of volatility of food
consumption.
Note: Annual graph is based on annual growth rates data sample, and biennial graph on the biennial
growth rates sample computed using even years of data only.
where 훽0,푔 reﬂects the variance of the measurement error, which is assumed to be stationary
and household (or group) speciﬁc.
Figure 2 provides graphical illustration of the mean and the 90/10 percentile ratio of
volatility of food consumption for annual and biennial data samples.37 The graph illustrates
37To compute food volatility on the biennial sample, I run the Euler equation on the biennial growth
rates, or 푙푛(퐹ℎ,푡)− 푙푛(퐹ℎ,푡−2), I then compute volatility as a squared residual from this Euler equation, after
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that food consumption volatility increased by 60 percent between 1968 and 1985, stayed high
until early nineties, fell 30 percent between 1993 and 1996, and then increased signiﬁcantly
until 2002, rising by 36 percent. Overall, between 1986 and 2004, the average household
experienced an increase of 68 percent in household food consumption. The 90/10 percentile
ratio, though highly variable, also exhibited a positive and signiﬁcant trend over the period,
more than doubling between 1968 and 2004. The reason for this trend comes from the fact
that 90th percentile increased steadily, whereas 10th percentile exhibited a downward trend
over the entire period.
Table 1 summarizes regression results on annual and biennial sample for volatility of food
and volatility of family income for an average household, and illustrates some very interesting
diﬀerences. The increase in volatility of family income was signiﬁcantly larger than that of
food expenditure: whereas volatility of family income doubled over the entire period, that
of food expenditure rose by 43 percent (based on trend calculations). The diﬀerences are
particularly stark for the 1970 to 1996 period: volatility of income increased by 70 percent
and that of food by 17 percent between 1970 and 1996; on the other hand, volatility of
income went up by 25 percent and that of food by 19 percent between 1996 and 2004.
Table 1: Volatility of real family income and real food expenditure, annual
and biennial samples.
annual biennial biennial, year> 1995
food income food income food income
year/1000 0.79*** 3.58*** 0.96*** 3.44*** 3.19*** 6.09***
(0.18) (0.27) (0.16) (0.24) (1.10) (1.84)
Constant -1.43*** -6.96*** -1.77*** -6.66*** -6.24*** -11.96***
(0.36) (0.53) (0.31) (0.47) (2.20) (3.69)
Observations 37,696 37,696 39,425 39,425 9,757 9,757
R-squared 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
Robust standard errors in parenthesis: *** 푝 < 0.001, ** 푝 < 0.05, * 푝 < 0.1
Not all households were aﬀected equally by these trends in income volatility. Table 2
removing ﬁrst the household ﬁxed eﬀects, to remove household speciﬁc discount factors, and time dummies,
to center the results.
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illustrates these diﬀerences on the biennial sample of data.38 The base group for these re-
gressions is a head of the household who is white, has more than 12 years of education, is not
a single parent and whose family income belongs to the median of the income distribution.
Education played an important role in the way households were aﬀected by income shocks.
Income volatility increased by less for households with less than 13 years of education than
for those with more education over 1970 to 2004 period. On the other hand, food consump-
tion volatility rose by signiﬁcantly more for households with low education. These trends
remained even after other controls were added to the regressions. Thus, households with
a high school degree or less had a harder time smoothing income shocks that were, at the
same time, not as high as those experienced by more educated households.
Volatility of family income had a similar increase for white and nonwhite households,
but nonwhite households were unable to smooth consumption in the same way as white
households. Volatility of food consumption increased by 52 percent for the nonwhite house-
holds, whereas white households experienced a much lower, though still high, 25 percent
increase. Having higher education did not seem to help nonwhite households either.39 On
the other hand, white households with less than 13 years of education endured a higher trend
in consumption volatility than whites with higher education, though the increase for these
households was still not as high as that for nonwhite households.
Since nonwhite and poorly educated households are typically those with lower family
income, controlling for income and the position of household within income distribution
might eliminate these diﬀerences. Table 2 illustrates that race and education continue to
play a signiﬁcant role even after income, working history, income quintiles, education, marital
status, size of the household, and age, were controlled for. It is in fact true that households
with higher family income had lower levels of both volatility of income and consumption.
Nevertheless, volatility of food consumption increased considerably for these households,
whereas income volatility increased by less (for poorly educated) or by the same amount (for
38Results for the annual sample are comparable and are available upon request.
39This observation might be a result of a very small sample of nonwhite households with more than 12
years of education.
19
nonwhite) as for the whites with higher education.
Did the magnitude of the shock play an important role in the way volatility of income
translated into volatility of consumption? Figures 1 and 2 gave a preview to the fact that
there were signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the way 90th and 10th percentiles of the shock distribution
behaved from that of the mean. Table 3 reports regression results for simultaneous-quantile
regressions for 0.10, 0.50 and 0.90 quantile of volatility of income and of volatility of food
expenditure on biennial sample.40 Major increase in volatility came from the increase in the
90th percentile of the volatility distribution, i.e. large shocks to income and to consumption
increased signiﬁcantly over the 1970-2004 period. There was an increase in median sized
shocks as well, though this increase was signiﬁcantly lower than that of the 90th percentile
of the distribution.
There are also some very interesting diﬀerences on how income shocks behaved depending
on where within the income distribution households’ family income lay. In particular, the
rise in income volatility was largest for the lowest quintile of the income distribution, even
after controlling for movements between quintiles. Similarly, households who were in the
top quintile experienced a high increase in income volatility, though for these households,
the increase was signiﬁcantly lower than that for the bottom of the income distribution.
Combining these observations with the simultaneous quantile regressions, we see that indeed,
households in the lowest quintile of the income distribution experienced a 200 percent increase
in volatility of income, if they also belonged to the 90th percentile of the income volatility
distribution; that compared to a 74 percent increase for the median family, and a 146 percent
increase if the household belonged to the top 20 percent of the income distribution. In
contrast, income quantiles did not play an important role in the way food volatility evolved
over time across diﬀerent quintiles of the shock distribution. What seemed to matter most
again was race and education of the head of the household, and not in the income distribution
where they belonged.
Unlike mean regressions, quantile regressions show some diﬀerences in income shocks af-
40Estimates on annual data are similar and are available upon request.
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fecting nonwhite households. In particular, income volatility increased for nonwhite house-
holds that belonged to the bottom 10 percent and the median of the income shock dis-
tribution. Volatility of food consumption, on the other hand, increased for the nonwhite
households across volatility distribution signiﬁcantly more than for the white households,
especially for those nonwhite households who belonged to the 90th percentile of the shock
distribution. Thus, even though evolution of large income shocks was not diﬀerent for white
and nonwhite households, ability of nonwhite households to smooth out these shocks was
much smaller than that of white households. Education also played an important role. Large
shocks to income increased by signiﬁcantly less for poorly educated households than for well
educated. Nevertheless, these shocks were high enough to guarantee that poorly educated
households were unable to smooth them in the same way as well educated households. Thus,
volatility of food consumption for households with less than 13 years of education increased
by more than for those with more education, especially if these households belonged to the
90th percentile of the shock distribution.
3.3 Why were nonwhite and poorly educated less able to smooth
income shocks?
To summarize, I ﬁnd that even though higher income and higher education households ex-
perienced greater increase in income uncertainty, traditionally vulnerable households (those
with low education, lower income, and/or who were nonwhite) experienced a disproportion-
ately higher increase in food consumption volatility. Not all income shocks were translated
into volatility of food expenditure, or households were able to smooth out a large fraction
of income shocks. Nevertheless, an increase in volatility of food expenditure, indicates that
household welfare was negatively aﬀected by increased income uncertainty, and welfare of
nonwhite and poorly educated was aﬀected the most.
Could the diﬀerence between the ability of white and nonwhite households to weather
increasing income shocks be due to lifestyle choice of these households? Are white and
nonwhite households spending their money on diﬀerent types of foods that have inheritably
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diﬀerent volatility properties? I investigate this question by adding a new variable into the
regression: share of food at home in the total food bill. While this variable is statistically
signiﬁcant, and shows that the increase in food volatility comes primarily from volatility in
the food away from home, it again does not eliminate the racial divide. Even controlling for
the share of the food bill spent on food at home, nonwhite households experience a much
more signiﬁcant increase in volatility of food consumption than white households with the
same food at home share.
Is it possible that public transfers favored white households? Nonwhite households in the
sample were more likely to receive public transfers than white households, 25 vs. 14 percent
in 2004, respectively; and received on average higher transfers, $275 more than white, who
received $547 in 2004. In fact, recent work by Moﬃtt and Scholz [2009] ﬁnds that there was
a redistribution of income from the very poor to near-poor and non-poor households, as the
later group experienced an increase in beneﬁts over 1984 to 2004 time period. However, even
though public transfers reduced the level of volatility experienced by its recipients, they were
not enough to reduce its growth.
Why were nonwhite and poorly educated households then unable to smooth out income
shocks to the same extent as white and better educated households? Vulnerable households
are typically households with low assets and signiﬁcantly lower ability to access credit mar-
kets. Examining summary statistics by race, the racial divide is clear: white households
have higher incomes, (white had $52,294 and nonwhite $34,520 in 2004), higher net wealth
holdings (including or excluding housing wealth), and are much less likely to have less than
2 months worth of family income in liquid assets. Even though the gap between white and
nonwhite households has fallen over the period, in 2004, one in 3 nonwhite unconstrained
households had less than 2 months of income in savings, versus 2 in 5 in 1983, but only 1
in 5 white households were in the same position in 2004 (these diﬀerences are statistically
signiﬁcant at p=0.000).
Nonwhite and poorly educated households were also considerably more likely to be denied
credit and this probability did not improve much over the period. Using the Survey of
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Consumer Finances data Dogra [2009] estimates evolution of liquidity constraints between
1980 and 2004. Dogra counts a household as liquidity constrained if either it had a request for
credit turned down and it was not able to obtain the full amount by reapplying or applying
elsewhere, or if it was discouraged from applying because it though it would be turned down.
He ﬁnds that poorer households, single parents and nonwhites, particularly those with 12
or less years of education, are still the most likely to be constrained, and that there is no
evidence that liquidity constraints slackened for these groups over the 1980-2004 period.
Gorbachev and Dogra [2009] continue this exercise by estimating liquidity constraints in
PSID data extending Jappelli et al. [1998] work on how to combine PSID and SCF surveys
to construct such measures. Their work shows that after 1995, credit constraints relaxed for
better oﬀ households - those in the upper income quantiles, and those with more than 12
years of education. By contrast, for poorer households, and those with less education, the
probability of being denied credit remained the same or even increased after 1998, and the
percentage of such households without a credit card also increased. Gorbachev and Dogra
[2009] also ﬁnd that nonwhite and poorly educated households are much more likely to be
denied credit than white and well educated households, and that this probability did not fall
over the 1980-2004 period. This observation goes against the common wisdom that liquidity
constraints relaxed since 1980s, and in particular against the view that vulnerable households
are now more likely to obtain loans (the view propagated by the subprime mortgage crisis).
While supply of credit increased dramatically over the period, as the mean real debt for all
households increased by 170%, from $17,000 to $47,000 (in 1983 dollars), between 1983 and
2007, an increase in debt does not imply that more consumers can obtain as much as they
desire. If, for example, consumers’ demand for debt has increased in line with the supply of
credit, the stock of consumer liabilities might increase, while the proportion of households
unable to borrow as much as they desire remains the same, or increases.
Given these trends in liquidity constraints and liquid asset holdings, it is not surprising
that nonwhite and poorly educated households were unable to smooth out increased income
shocks to the extent white and well educated households did, and that the welfare cost from
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increased income uncertainty to these vulnerable households was signiﬁcantly larger.
Since food consumption is well known to have low income elasticity, (see for example,
Bunkers and Cochrane [1957]), the results presented here are a lower bound of what might
have actually happened to volatility of total nondurable consumption. I follow Blundell
et al. [2008] and estimate responsiveness of food consumption to changes in nondurables.
Using data from Consumer Expenditure Survey for 1980-2004 period,41 I estimate a demand
equation for food as a function of relative prices, as well as nondurable expenditure and a host
of demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of the household. Similar to Blundell et al.
[2008], I ﬁnd that the elasticity of food consumption with respect to nondurable consumption
is 0.85 and is highly statistically signiﬁcant (p=0.000). Even though this elasticity changes
over time, I cannot reject the joint signiﬁcance test, regressions don’t have enough power to
estimate precisely these changes. I also estimate demand equations for each year of available
data, and ﬁnd that the budget elasticity falls over time, though I cannot reject equality of the
estimated coeﬃcients. Elasticity is estimated at 0.69 (with standard error of 0.31) in 1980,
0.59 (s.e. 0.28) in 1990, and 0.56 (s.e. 0.21) in 2004. Keeping to conservative estimates (those
obtained from the pooled regression model with controls for time changes in the elasticity
parameter), a 1 percent change in nondurable consumption will lead to a 0.85 percent change
in food expenditure. Therefore, a 1 percent increase in volatility of food consumption will
translate into a 1.38 = 1/(0.85)2 percent increase in volatility of nondurable consumption;
or a 43 percent increase in food consumption volatility translates into a 60 percent increase
in volatility of nondurable consumption. If changes in the elasticity are taken into account
this too is an underestimate.
4 Conclusion
The increase in household income and consumption risk over 1970-2004 stands in sharp
contrast to the dramatic fall in aggregate volatility of the US economy over the 1984-2004
period. Aggregate volatility of the US economy fell by 60 percent since 1984. Volatility
41Blundell et al. [2008] study used data for 1980-1992 period only.
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Figure 3: Aggregate vs. Household Income Volatility
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Source: National Income and Public Accounts data and Panel Study of Income Dynamics.
Note: NIPA refers to volatility of GDP using NIPA data, all the other series are computed using PSID.
Variance and covariances are computed on a 5-year moving window. Average household volatility series was
scaled down by 10 in order to ﬁt it onto the same graph with aggregate volatility and average covariances.
of aggregate real food consumption also fell over 1970-2004 period, dropping by 73 percent
since its peak in 1976. Aggregate volatility computed on PSID data tracks remarkably well
volatility computed on NIPA data. After 2000, aggregate volatility in PSID shows a stronger
rise than that observed in NIPA. Nevertheless, correlation of the two series is 0.86 for years
before 1996 and 0.9 after 1995.
From a simple decomposition, it is easy to see how the current situation, in which ag-
gregate volatility fell but mean household volatility increased, might occur. Assuming for
simplicity that aggregate consumption growth, 훾퐶푡 , can be expressed as an average of house-
hold consumption growth rates, 훾푐ℎ,푡, then aggregate volatility, 푉 푎푟푡
[
1
퐻
∑퐻
ℎ=1 훾
푐
ℎ,푡
]
, can be
decomposed into average household volatility, 1
퐻2
∑퐻
ℎ=1 푉 푎푟ℎ,푡(훾
푐
ℎ,푡), plus average covariances
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between diﬀerent households, 2
퐻2
∑
푖 ∕=푗 퐶표푣푡(훾
푐
푖,푡, 훾
푐
푗,푡). Thus, aggregate volatility could go
down while average household volatility goes up, if average covariances fall enough to com-
pensate for this diﬀerential.
Figure 3 illustrates this concept on PSID and NIPA data. To be consistent with the
way aggregate volatility is computed in the macro literature,42 I calculate volatility (and
covariances) as a 5-year moving variance (covariance) on demeaned family income growth,
and not on the idiosyncratic shocks to income. The graph illustrates that in the US economy,
between 1984 and 2000, aggregate shocks became less important as a source of variation of
household income. It also illustrates that average covariances follow closely the trend in
aggregate volatility, though on a very diﬀerent scale. The data covers two major recessions
in the US, that of 1980-1982 and 2001. During these recessions, there was a rise in both
average covariances and aggregate volatility series.43 The rise in average covariances is, in
percentage terms, quite dramatic. Even though my data does not cover the current recession,
it is likely that both household income volatility and average covariances continued to rise
after it’s unset. As the period of relative economic stability, 1984 to 2000, illustrates: low
aggregate uncertainty is not a guarantee that household income risk will also be low. On the
other hand, a deep recession reinforces idiosyncratic shocks making an already bad situation
worse.
There have been several signiﬁcant changes in patterns of volatility in the US economy
over the past several decades. Income volatility, and both its transitory and permanent com-
ponents increased since 1970, leading to a signiﬁcant rise in consumption volatility. Possible
explanations for these trends might include greater wage ﬂexibility,44 fall in progressivity of
42See for example McConnell and Perez-Quiros [2000], Stock and Watson [2002], and Blanchard and Simon
[2001].
43Recessions are (almost by deﬁnition) a time of large, negative, aggregate shocks to household income.
Correlation coeﬃcients will depend on the variance of aggregate shocks relative to the variance of idiosyncratic
shocks. So correlation will go up in a recession, because idiosyncratic shocks are the same as usual and
aggregate shocks are much larger.
44Davis and Kahn [2008] put forward this explanation in their recent survey of evolution of volatility in
macro and micro data.
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the US tax code,45 changes in the generosity of the welfare programs especially after the
reforms of 1996,46 and increases in health care costs. For nonwhite households and those
with low education the ability to smooth income shocks was particularly hampered by low
holdings of net wealth and poor access to credit markets.
45According to Piketty and Saez [2007] the U.S. tax system became less progressive over the last 40 years.
There have also been important changes to capital taxation. For example, Dai et al. [2008] analyze the eﬀect
that the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 had on increase in stock return volatility. This increase, they point out,
is due to the reduced risk sharing between the investors and the government, which increased consumption
risk.
46See work by Moﬃtt and Scholz [2009] for a recent review of the evolution of welfare program in the US
over the last 30 years.
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Table 2: Volatilty of food or income by race of the head of the household , biennial sample
VARIABLES food income white nonwhite white nonwhite food income white nonwhite
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
year/1000 1.556*** 4.566*** 1.379*** 4.683** 4.458*** 5.554*** 5.054*** 5.371*** 5.168*** 5.965
(0.392) (0.516) (0.398) (1.976) (0.529) (1.743) (1.692) (1.623) (1.743) (7.105)
nonwhite * year/1000 0.819 0.080 1.448* 0.078
(0.652) (0.816) (0.858) (1.101)
single parent * year/1000 0.888 -0.019 1.111 0.787 0.419 0.177 0.502 -1.040 1.287 -2.064
(0.924) (1.310) (1.012) (2.198) (1.496) (3.108) (1.308) (1.769) (1.458) (2.766)
edu<13 * year/1000 0.594* -2.352*** 0.621* 0.085 -2.507*** 0.587 -0.236 -2.508*** -0.274 -0.407
(0.359) (0.558) (0.368) (1.539) (0.584) (1.765) (0.467) (0.700) (0.482) (1.854)
food at home as share of total food * year/1000 -4.854** -1.265 -5.235** -1.086
(2.075) (1.951) (2.147) (7.960)
food at home as share of total food 9.502** 2.419 10.255** 1.999
(4.129) (3.882) (4.270) (15.884)
ln(real family income) -0.015** -0.163*** -0.015** -0.009 -0.142*** -0.431*** -0.014** -0.159*** -0.017** 0.014
(0.006) (0.028) (0.007) (0.025) (0.028) (0.083) (0.007) (0.030) (0.007) (0.021)
ln(real public transfers) 0.004*** 0.006*** 0.004*** -0.001 0.006*** 0.006** 0.003*** 0.006*** 0.004*** -0.004*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
1st income quintile * year/1000 -1.990*** 7.514*** -1.976*** -2.910 8.203*** 0.007 -3.093*** 9.677*** -3.276*** -2.839
(0.695) (1.320) (0.731) (2.477) (1.466) (2.727) (0.931) (1.739) (0.986) (3.185)
2nd income quintile * year/1000 -1.323** 0.881 -0.979* -4.824** 1.166* -2.504 -1.448** 0.921 -1.218* -4.048
(0.523) (0.639) (0.538) (2.127) (0.683) (1.708) (0.670) (0.852) (0.695) (2.643)
4th income quintile * year/1000 -0.837* -0.774 -0.597 -3.845* -0.871* 0.184 -1.150* -0.856 -0.869 -4.993*
(0.454) (0.489) (0.463) (2.057) (0.507) (1.792) (0.597) (0.635) (0.610) (2.692)
5th income quintile * year/1000 -0.253 1.946*** -0.046 -2.313 1.635** 5.943** -0.331 2.671*** 0.035 -6.328*
(0.469) (0.640) (0.476) (2.319) (0.659) (2.468) (0.608) (0.809) (0.614) (3.266)
change in number of hours worked, head -0.002 -0.018** -0.003 -0.000 -0.014** -0.042* -0.000 -0.017** -0.000 0.000
(0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.008) (0.007) (0.025) (0.004) (0.008) (0.004) (0.006)
number of hours worked, head 0.000** 0.000*** 0.000** -0.000 0.000*** 0.000 0.000 0.000*** 0.000* 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
change in number of hours worked, wife -0.000 0.001 -0.000 0.001 0.001 -0.003 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003)
Age 0.004** -0.002 0.004*** -0.004 -0.001 -0.012 0.003 -0.000 0.004** -0.011*
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.002) (0.008) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.006)
Age squared -0.000*** 0.000 -0.000*** 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000** 0.000*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
nonwhite -1.603 -0.184 -2.859* -0.180
(1.296) (1.618) (1.706) (2.188)
single parent -1.792 -0.010 -2.232 -1.594 -0.875 -0.425 -1.014 2.028 -2.574 4.096
(1.838) (2.599) (2.012) (4.372) (2.967) (6.180) (2.605) (3.517) (2.904) (5.507)
education<13 -1.185* 4.654*** -1.239* -0.185 4.960*** -1.168 0.469 4.965*** 0.547 0.797
(0.714) (1.107) (0.731) (3.061) (1.159) (3.504) (0.928) (1.390) (0.959) (3.690)
change in marital status 0.072*** 0.140*** 0.073*** 0.062* 0.149*** 0.064* 0.066*** 0.139*** 0.069*** 0.043
(0.009) (0.012) (0.009) (0.035) (0.012) (0.035) (0.010) (0.013) (0.010) (0.037)
change in number of adults 0.004 -0.010** 0.003 0.014 -0.013** 0.004 0.004 -0.010* 0.003 0.000
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.015) (0.005) (0.014) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.017)
number of adults -0.013*** 0.017*** -0.013*** -0.009 0.020*** -0.000 -0.004 0.022*** -0.003 -0.000
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.012) (0.004) (0.010) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.015)
change in number of kids -0.011*** 0.001 -0.001 -0.004 -0.006 -0.006 -0.003* 0.005* 0.000 -0.026
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.016) (0.004) (0.011) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.016)
number of kids -0.001 -0.006 -0.011*** -0.010** 0.000 0.001 -0.002 -0.005 -0.003* -0.003
(0.003) (0.004) (0.001) (0.005) (0.002) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.002) (0.006)
1st income quintile 4.017*** -14.820*** 3.995*** 5.819 -16.148*** -0.289 6.218*** -19.126*** 6.585*** 5.711
(1.379) (2.621) (1.452) (4.912) (2.910) (5.399) (1.852) (3.457) (1.962) (6.331)
2nd income quintile 2.638** -1.764 1.955* 9.577** -2.322* 4.858 2.888** -1.841 2.431* 8.046
(1.038) (1.267) (1.069) (4.222) (1.354) (3.383) (1.333) (1.692) (1.383) (5.253)
4th income quintile 1.661* 1.573 1.187 7.594* 1.762* -0.257 2.280* 1.734 1.725 9.872*
(0.901) (0.969) (0.919) (4.083) (1.005) (3.549) (1.188) (1.262) (1.213) (5.352)
5th income quintile 0.512 -3.701*** 0.101 4.607 -3.097** -11.480** 0.655 -5.157*** -0.071 12.583*
(0.930) (1.263) (0.945) (4.599) (1.301) (4.877) (1.209) (1.600) (1.221) (6.498)
change in quintile 0.007*** -0.022*** 0.007*** 0.017 -0.023*** -0.011 0.008*** -0.024*** 0.007*** 0.022*
(0.002) (0.006) (0.002) (0.010) (0.006) (0.018) (0.002) (0.007) (0.002) (0.012)
Constant -2.857*** -7.315*** -2.521*** -8.920** -7.354*** -6.163* -9.716*** -8.931*** -9.950*** -11.497
(0.777) (0.966) (0.790) (3.905) (0.991) (3.373) (3.358) (3.222) (3.457) (14.154)
Observations 37526 37526 34492 3034 34492 3034 31181 31181 28710 2471
R-squared 0.022 0.079 0.022 0.023 0.078 0.148 0.029 0.080 0.030 0.034
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: Information on food at home as a share of total food expenditure is available from 1978 onwards due to availability of relevant CPI data. 
year>1977all food food, year>1977income
Table 3. Quantile regressions: volatility of food expenditure vs. volatility of family income, biennial sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
VARIABLES q10 q50 q90 q10 q50 q90 q10 q50 q90 q10 q50 q90
year/1000 -0.014*** 0.402*** 4.877*** -0.001 0.266*** 5.398*** -0.019*** 0.167 2.528*** -0.004 0.290*** 7.562***
(0.004) (0.146) (1.199) (0.005) (0.092) (0.949) (0.005) (0.154) (0.939) (0.004) (0.062) (0.840)
nonwhite * year/1000 -0.001 0.758** 4.028** 0.025* 0.221* 1.024
(0.011) (0.315) (1.653) (0.015) (0.129) (1.864)
nonwhite 0.003 -1.492** -7.940** -0.049* -0.436* -2.055
(0.022) (0.625) (3.273) (0.029) (0.256) (3.695)
single parent * year/1000 0.006 0.381 2.247 0.043 0.564 3.225
(0.012) (0.471) (4.249) (0.030) (0.367) (4.232)
single parent -0.012 -0.758 -4.479 -0.086 -1.122 -6.413
(0.024) (0.934) (8.417) (0.060) (0.729) (8.381)
edu<13 * year/1000 0.012** 0.383*** 2.725*** 0.008 -0.053 -4.198***
(0.006) (0.124) (0.914) (0.006) (0.090) (0.979)
edu<13 -0.023** -0.765*** -5.445*** -0.016 0.107 8.319***
(0.011) (0.245) (1.815) (0.012) (0.178) (1.942)
1st income quintile * year/1000 -0.010 0.113 -2.319 0.056*** 2.115*** 29.175*** -0.016* -0.152 -2.710 0.044** 2.069*** 28.765***
(0.012) (0.364) (2.355) (0.021) (0.451) (3.927) (0.008) (0.332) (2.571) (0.018) (0.545) (5.557)
2nd income quintile * year/1000 0.004 -0.064 -1.405 -0.010 -0.090 5.060** 0.002 -0.147 -1.037 -0.018* -0.119 5.246***
(0.005) (0.175) (1.465) (0.009) (0.164) (2.061) (0.007) (0.217) (1.751) (0.010) (0.165) (1.977)
4th income quintile * year/1000 0.004 -0.102 -2.328* -0.003 -0.190 -2.183* 0.003 -0.082 -1.740 -0.004 -0.203** -2.867**
(0.005) (0.187) (1.377) (0.009) (0.118) (1.319) (0.006) (0.146) (1.076) (0.006) (0.081) (1.185)
5th income quintile * year/1000 0.009 0.018 -2.153 0.018** 0.130 5.023*** 0.008 0.064 -0.712 0.019*** 0.121 3.603**
(0.008) (0.179) (1.649) (0.007) (0.125) (1.366) (0.010) (0.164) (0.918) (0.007) (0.131) (1.461)
1st income quintile 0.021 -0.200 4.872 -0.110*** -4.141*** -57.140*** 0.032* 0.326 5.652 -0.087** -4.049*** -56.327***
(0.023) (0.722) (4.682) (0.041) (0.896) (7.771) (0.016) (0.659) (5.094) (0.035) (1.080) (11.009)
4th income quintile -0.009 0.131 2.840 0.020 0.191 -9.923** -0.004 0.296 2.107 0.036* 0.249 -10.286***
(0.011) (0.347) (2.911) (0.017) (0.326) (4.083) (0.013) (0.430) (3.472) (0.019) (0.327) (3.915)
2nd income quintile -0.007 0.202 4.608* 0.005 0.374 4.289 -0.007 0.161 3.440 0.007 0.402** 5.637**
(0.009) (0.373) (2.738) (0.018) (0.235) (2.613) (0.011) (0.291) (2.136) (0.012) (0.161) (2.348)
5th income quintile -0.018 -0.035 4.262 -0.035** -0.251 -9.905*** -0.016 -0.128 1.396 -0.038*** -0.233 -7.093**
(0.016) (0.356) (3.276) (0.015) (0.249) (2.706) (0.021) (0.326) (1.819) (0.013) (0.260) (2.892)
change in quintile -0.000 0.002*** 0.022*** 0.000*** 0.005*** 0.027*** 0.000 0.002*** 0.021*** 0.000*** 0.005*** 0.029***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.004) (0.000) (0.001) (0.003) (0.000) (0.001) (0.005) (0.000) (0.001) (0.004)
Constant 0.028*** -0.762*** -9.382*** 0.002 -0.504*** -10.424*** 0.039*** -0.294 -4.706** 0.008 -0.553*** -14.710***
(0.008) (0.289) (2.384) (0.009) (0.184) (1.881) (0.011) (0.306) (1.863) (0.008) (0.123) (1.665)
Observations 37787 37787 37787 37787 37787 37787 37529 37529 37529 37529 37529 37529
Boot strapped standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
food income food income
Appendix to
“Did Household Consumption Become More Volatile?”
May 13, 2010
A Data Sample: Panel Study of Income Dynamics
The Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), which began in 1968, is a longitudinal study of a
representative sample of U.S. individuals (men, women, and children) and the family units in which
they reside, and is conducted by the University of Michigan. The PSID’s sample size has grown
from 4,800 families in 1968 to more than 7,000 families (and over 60,000 individuals) in 2001. Some
families are followed for as much as 36 consecutive years.
Consumption data in PSID are limited to food and shelter. I compute all the consumption
volatility measures on food consumption calculated as a sum of food consumed at home plus away
from home plus food stamps received. The core sample contains data from 1968 to 2005, and
consists of heads of households (both female and male) who are not students and are not retired.
I keep households whose head is at least 25 years old but less than 65. I drop all the households
that belonged to the Latino or Immigrant samples, and those that were drawn from the Survey
of Economic Opportunity (SEO). Households that report negative or zero total food consumption
levels are also eliminated. In order to minimize eﬀects of outliers on the results, I follow the
literature by dropping households who report more than 500 percent change in family income or
food consumption over a one year period as well as those whose income or consumption fall by
more than 95 percent (see for example Zeldes [1989] or Blundell et al. [2008]).
The most important issue to note regarding the data is that it became biennial after 1997. Thus,
I compute all my results on annual data before 1997. I then construct a hypothetical biennial sample
to study the evolution of consumption volatility up to 2004. Since income and consumption data
is collected for previous year, the biennial sample has data for even years from 1976 to 2004. In
addition, food consumption data was not collected in 1973, 1988 and 1989. I do not impute for the
missing years in order to keep measurement error and misidentiﬁcation to a minimum.
At the time of the interview, the respondent is asked questions about income, transfers, wealth
and expenditures on food and shelter. The families are asked to report income and transfers
received during the previous year. I use total family income to compute income uncertainty. I
adjust income data by one period to correspond to the appropriate demographic characteristics for
each household. The timing of consumption data is more ambiguous. I follow Blundell et al. [2008],
among many others, and assume that the respondent provided information on food expenditures for
the previous year. I use an annual average of monthly data on 1-year constant maturity Treasury
bills.
1
All the income, expenditure, wealth, and interest rate data are expressed in real terms. Nominal
data are converted into real using item speciﬁc regional not seasonally adjusted all urban Consumers
Consumer Price Index (CPI-U) with base period of 1982-1984=100. Thus, food expenditures are
deﬂated using the Food and Beverages CPI; housing expenditures, using the Housing CPI; and all
income, wealth and interest rate series, using All-Items CPI.
We separate our sample into liquidity constrained and unconstrained households using infor-
mation from Wealth Supplements. Wealth information was collected in 1984, 1989, 1994, 1999 and
biennially after that. Household is counted as liquidity unconstrained if they had positive non-
housing net wealth. For the years when wealth data is unavailable, I estimate the probit regression,
probability of having positive net non-housing wealth, as a function of explanatory variables.
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A.1 Supplementary Figures
Figure 1: The Ratio of Food Prices to the Price of All Other Goods, (1982-1984==100)
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Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics.
A.2 Supplementary Tables
3
A1. Summary Statistics, households with positive net non housing wealth, or liquidity unconstrained households
mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd
age 41.93 11.35 38.36 10.45 39.20 8.79 42.57 9.72 43.06 10.77
number of adults 2.08 0.71 1.96 0.67 1.94 0.64 1.98 0.71 1.94 0.67
number of kids 1.47 1.46 1.17 1.19 1.10 1.17 0.92 1.11 0.86 1.07
female 0.13 0.33 0.14 0.34 0.14 0.35 0.16 0.36 0.17 0.37
nonwhite 0.10 0.30 0.09 0.29 0.09 0.29 0.10 0.30 0.10 0.30
married 0.81 0.39 0.77 0.42 0.75 0.43 0.72 0.45 0.72 0.45
single parent 0.04 0.19 0.05 0.22 0.05 0.21 0.05 0.22 0.06 0.23
real family income $32,194 18,612     $34,934 29,689         $39,621 32,772         $49,504 54,999         $50,183 83,350         
real labour income, head $21,353 14,871     $22,578 16,089         $24,824 24,007         $29,364 37,439         $29,429 50,584         
real labour income, wife $3,584 6,113       $5,240 7,626           $8,051 10,871         $10,075 18,377         $10,402 14,850         
total real food expenditure $4,945 2,401       $4,351 2,178           $4,059 2,239           $4,141 2,239           $4,136 2,396           
real food expenditure, home $3,404 1,851           $3,087 1,946           $2,833 1,635           $2,780 1,687           
real food expenditure, away from home $900 1,034           $943 915              $1,277 1,224           $1,304 1,434           
real home value $14,536 13,819     $45,071 48,002         $78,713 103,848       $133,332 178,776       $195,349 260,407       
real net non housing wealth $83,487 442,372       $94,317 306,501       $120,599 652,103       $136,203 647,551
real net wealth including housing $116,819 455,379       $128,413 333,071       $161,730 688,252       $193,296 696,897
home owner 0.72 0.45 0.71 0.45 0.70 0.46 0.76 0.43 0.76 0.43
annual hours worked, head 2,214       717          2,153           699              2,246           647              2,140           628              2,178           758              
annual hours worked, wife 531          782          727              859              988              957              1,009           975              1,040           1,020           
unemployed 0.01 0.12 0.03 0.16 0.02 0.16 0.03 0.17 0.03 0.16
on welfare 0.03 0.17 0.04 0.20 0.02 0.14 0.02 0.13 0.04 0.18
observations 1415 2101 2361 2863 2948
Note: Wealth information is for 1983, 1993, 2000, 2004. Price data for food at home and away from home is available starting 1978.
20041970 1980 1990 2000
A2: Summary statistics: real family income vs. real food expenditure by quintile for the liquidity unconstrained.
y≤20 20>y≥40 40>y≥60 60>y≥80 y>80 y≤20 20>y≥40 40>y≥60 60>y≥80 y>80
1970 12,319      22,026      29,460      37,804      59,396      3,300        4,247        4,804        5,474        6,904        
(3,982) (2,357) (2,133) (2,834) (20,496) (1,768) (1,636) (2,013) (2,152) (2,654)
1980 12,285      22,197      30,460      40,006      69,904      2,803        3,742        4,427        4,857        5,970        
(4,076) (2,388) (2,320) (3,535) (49,350) (1,631) (1,654) (1,833) (1,961) (2,356)
1990 12,601      23,840      33,674      45,594      82,451      2,683        3,477        3,896        4,729        5,512        
(4,576) (2,910) (3,039) (3,823) (49,355) (1,518) (1,595) (1,584) (2,712) (2,360)
2000 11,846      24,131      35,469      49,972      109,082    2,898        3,320        3,891        4,475        5,593        
(5,031) (3,077) (3,516) (5,382) (88,471) (1,993) (1,764) (1,749) (1,861) (2,564)
2004 11,504      23,756      35,408      49,434      111,973    2,698        3,505        3,856        4,404        5,629        
(4,500) (3,433) (3,434) (5,031) (155,326) (1,597) (1,784) (1,743) (2,327) (2,929)
1983 25,533      26,080      46,917      100,559    217,450    37,739      43,863      75,160      138,271    287,880    
(89,388) (54,734) (256,992) (612,163) (706,571) (96,025) (66,456) (268,761) (617,496) (724,826)
1993 61,497      43,317      42,421      82,208      241,619    77,035      65,613      68,669      120,679    309,215    
(334,796) (207,569) (76,895) (148,147) (509,582) (346,775) (243,601) (100,715) (159,233) (545,802)
2000 37,434      43,993      60,791      88,479      324,234    52,706      65,304      89,308      129,941    410,559    
(148,632) (113,414) (161,677) (363,260) (1,271,468) (154,977) (129,980) (178,839) (381,668) (1,332,628)
2004 28,492      64,597      81,760      102,169    345,840    44,574      90,787      119,872    155,885    475,433    
(95,680) (303,799) (243,655) (270,951) (1,239,187) (112,169) (314,627) (269,987) (290,241) (1,319,365)
1970 0.31 0.21 0.21 0.09 0.17 0.95 0.83 0.76 0.63 0.54
1980 0.26 0.29 0.16 0.18 0.11 0.75 0.62 0.51 0.47 0.31
1990 0.33 0.30 0.19 0.09 0.10 0.70 0.56 0.48 0.31 0.18
2000 0.25 0.25 0.18 0.21 0.11 0.63 0.58 0.50 0.32 0.17
2004 0.26 0.20 0.16 0.25 0.14 0.62 0.57 0.48 0.34 0.15
Note: Quintiles are computed on real family income for each available year of data, and includes negative or zero values.
Real Family Income
SHARE OF NONWHITE WITHIN NONWHITE IN QUINTILE SHARE WITH EDU<13 WITHIN QUINTILE
Real Food Expenditure
Real Net Non Housing Wealth Real Net Wealth including Housing 
A3. Euler Equation Estimation: OLS vs. LSDV
VARIABLES
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Age 0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Age squared -0.000* -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
change in number of adults 0.124*** 0.124*** 0.127*** 0.127*** 0.121*** 0.121*** 0.123*** 0.123***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
change in number of kids 0.105*** 0.105*** 0.104*** 0.104*** 0.104*** 0.104*** 0.104*** 0.104***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
change in marital status -0.033*** -0.033*** -0.035*** -0.035*** -0.035*** -0.035*** -0.034*** -0.034***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
change in num hours worked, head 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003** 0.003** 0.003*** 0.003***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
change in num hours worked, wife 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.016*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.014*** 0.014***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
income volatility -0.006 -0.006 -0.005 -0.005 0.004 0.004 0.006 0.005
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
change in real house value 0.026*** 0.026*** 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.026*** 0.026*** 0.021*** 0.021***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
change in rentalship 0.050** 0.050** 0.055*** 0.055*** 0.044** 0.044** 0.048** 0.048**
(0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.022) (0.024) (0.024)
change in ownership 0.056 0.055 0.123 0.122 0.047 0.048 0.159* 0.160*
(0.075) (0.075) (0.079) (0.079) (0.084) (0.084) (0.089) (0.089)
change in real rent 0.032*** 0.032*** 0.034*** 0.034*** 0.033*** 0.033*** 0.039*** 0.039***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
ln(real interest rate, h) 0.112** 0.021 0.130** 0.053 0.112 0.136* 0.129 0.152*
(0.053) (0.065) (0.059) (0.071) (0.072) (0.081) (0.079) (0.088)
price differential 0.011*** 0.010** -0.018 -0.017
(0.004) (0.004) (0.019) (0.020)
estimated Pr(wealth>0) 0.046** 0.051** 0.020 0.021
(0.021) (0.021) (0.039) (0.039)
Constant 0.018 -0.026 -0.014 -0.054 0.025 0.073 -0.037 0.009
Observations 42973 42973 37730 37730 42973 42973 37730 37730
R-squared 0.051 0.051 0.053 0.053 0.121 0.121 0.134 0.134
Number of pid 5320 5320 4936 4936 5320 5320 4936 4936
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
OLS LSDV
unconstrainedall all unconstrained
A4: Euler Equation Estimation:  Arellano-Bond (AB) GMM
VARIABLES
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Age 0.001 -0.008 0.001 0.011 -0.006 0.003
(0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.011)
Age squared -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
change in number of adults 0.091*** 0.089*** 0.089*** 0.102*** 0.089*** 0.095***
(0.029) (0.029) (0.031) (0.032) (0.031) (0.032)
change in number of kids -0.024 0.006 -0.019 0.028 0.001 0.018
(0.077) (0.074) (0.079) (0.080) (0.075) (0.075)
change in marital status -0.074*** -0.069*** -0.067** -0.056** -0.065** -0.060**
(0.027) (0.026) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
change in num hours worked, head -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
change in num hours worked, wife 0.059*** 0.058*** 0.046*** 0.045** 0.043** 0.043**
(0.016) (0.016) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
income volatility 0.059 0.086 0.046 0.020 0.068 0.081
(0.062) (0.062) (0.064) (0.065) (0.063) (0.071)
change in real house value 0.048* 0.055** 0.050 0.048 0.052* 0.051
(0.029) (0.027) (0.033) (0.032) (0.031) (0.031)
change in rental status 0.011 0.006 -0.013 -0.009 -0.014 -0.024
(0.058) (0.058) (0.064) (0.066) (0.065) (0.064)
change in ownership 0.458 0.460 0.520 0.588 0.600* 0.493
(0.337) (0.296) (0.397) (0.412) (0.353) (0.350)
change in real rent 0.115*** 0.124*** 0.124** 0.134** 0.137** 0.122**
(0.041) (0.042) (0.053) (0.060) (0.053) (0.055)
ln(real interest rate, h) 1.778 1.353 1.250 1.735* 1.323* 1.178
(1.256) (0.837) (1.222) (1.034) (0.789) (0.748)
price differential 0.131 0.134 0.161
(0.094) (0.093) (0.132)
estimated Pr(wealth>0) -0.116 0.285
(0.333) (0.304)
Observations 33965 33965 29931 29491 29931 29491
R-squared
Number of pid 4695 4695 4363 4255 4363 4255
Arrelano-Bond test for AR(1) -33.11 -33.50 -32.68 -31.63 -32.87 -31.06
Pr>z 0 0.195 0.259 0.363 0 0
Arrelano-Bond test for AR(2) 12.61 12.70 12.41 11.19 12.42 11.15
Pr>z 0 0 0 0 0.270 0.345
Arrelano-Bond test for AR(3) -1.301 -1.297 -1.128 -0.911 -1.103 -0.943
Pr>z 0.193 0 0 0 0 0
Sargan test of overid 20.79 18.14 19.09 21.89 16.82 20.33
df 13 14 13 14 14 15
Prob>chi2 0.0772 0.200 0.120 0.364 0.693 0.544
Hansen test of overid 13.63 11.97 12.74 15.21 10.92 13.76
df 13 14 13 14 14 15
Prob>chi2 0.401 0.609 0.468 0.0809 0.266 0.160
Number of Instruments 32 34 32 34 34 36
F-stat 6.069 6.202 4.507 4.194 4.586 4.096
Prob>F 0 0 2.56e-10 1.10e-09 5.05e-11 1.01e-09
Avg num obs 7.234 7.234 6.860 6.931 6.860 6.931
max num obs 19 19 19 19 19 19
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
unconstrained all
A5: Volatilty of real family income and real food expenditure, biennial samples
food income food income food income food income food income
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
year/1000 0.898*** 3.323*** 0.945*** 3.329*** 0.567** 4.001*** 0.605*** 4.080*** 2.050*** 2.460***
(0.161) (0.250) (0.159) (0.243) (0.272) (0.429) (0.224) (0.347) (0.344) (0.359)
nonwhite * year/1000 0.719 1.211
(0.605) (0.802)
single parent * year/1000 0.177 2.614**
(0.842) (1.154)
continuously married * year/1000 0.354 -1.261**
(0.331) (0.509)
years of education<13 * year/1000 0.945*** -1.003**
(0.322) (0.480)
1st income quintile * year/1000 -1.531** 8.554***
(0.666) (1.299)
2nd income quintile * year/1000 -0.953* 1.181*
(0.517) (0.624)
4th income quintile * year/1000 -1.076** -0.906*
(0.449) (0.478)
5th income quintile * year/1000 -0.734 0.900
(0.454) (0.551)
nonwhite -1.391 -2.383
(1.203) (1.591)
single parent -0.321 -5.144**
(1.674) (2.290)
continuously married -0.756 2.446**
(0.657) (1.011)
years of education<13 -1.871*** 2.015**
(0.639) (0.952)
1st income quintile 3.131** -16.732***
(1.323) (2.577)
2nd income quintile 1.912* -2.310*
(1.026) (1.237)
4th income quintile 2.130** 1.793*
(0.891) (0.949)
5th income quintile 1.451 -1.742
(0.901) (1.094)
change in quintile 0.009*** -0.018***
(0.002) (0.005)
Constant -1.654*** -6.435*** -1.744*** -6.447*** -0.961* -7.745*** -1.070** -7.949*** -3.952*** -4.773***
(0.320) (0.497) (0.315) (0.482) (0.541) (0.851) (0.445) (0.690) (0.682) (0.713)
Observations 39365 39365 39425 39425 39425 39425 39163 39163 37787 37787
R-squared 0.002 0.006 0.001 0.007 0.009 0.011 0.001 0.007 0.013 0.059
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
A6: Black-White Divide
white nonwhite white nonwhite white nonwhite white nonwhite
0.17 0.40 0.15 0.30 0.20 0.33 0.19 0.30
(0.38) (0.49) (0.36) (0.46) (0.40) (0.47) (0.39) (0.46)
Real family income $36,715 $26,342 $44,088 $29,993 $51,513 $33,091 $52,294 $34,520
(27,034) (16,261) (46,967) (38,640) (56,987) (28,719) (87,842) (27,793)
Real nonhousing net wealth $89,305 $19,312 $99,087 $34,838 $129,727 $40,359 $145,185 $62,950
(461,325) (46,061) (317,085) (76,817) (686,513) (114,193) (675,682) (339,143)
Real net wealth, including housing $123,872 $38,834 $134,814 $52,999 $173,283 $60,524 $206,313 $86,360
(474,430) (73,288) (344,264) (100,867) (724,021) (134,658) (727,563) (348,761)
Standard deviation in parentheses
2004
Nonhousing wealth less than 2 
months of family income
1983 1993 2000
